Please note: an
extended briefing is also available for download in PDF format.
The ethical objection to suicide is reflected in law. In Britain, for
compassionate reasons, there are no legal penalties for a person who
attempts suicide, but assisting a suicide remains an offence.
Parliament recognised that people who have tried to kill themselves
need help rather than punishment. There is therefore no legal right to
suicide, and certainly no right to involve others in killing oneself.
This is because the right to life is an inalienable right. No one may
dispose of an innocent person's life, and so one cannot, in justice,
intentionally deprive oneself of life.
If the law were to allow some individuals to volunteer for euthanasia, this would also threaten the right to life of others, especially the elderly, the gravely ill and the disabled. Legalisation of euthanasia would make a clear statement to society that it was permissible for private citizens (e.g. doctors) to kill because they accepted the view that a patient's life was no longer worthwhile. If it is seen as a benefit to kill patients who consent to euthanasia, it is easy to argue that others should not be denied death simply because they cannot ask for it. Courts in Britain and other countries have already judged that some incapacitated patients may be starved to death and this challenges the notion that euthanasia would remain voluntary if allowed by statute law.
Sometimes a distinction is made between active euthanasia (e.g.
a lethal injection) and passive euthanasia, which involves withholding
or withdrawing treatment. However, it is misleading to describe
withholding or discontinuing treatment as euthanasia unless this is
done with the intention of killing the patient. Sometimes a treatment
may properly be withdrawn even though the patient has consented to it,
for example, when it is futile, merely prolonging the dying process in
a terminally ill patient.
The doctor's intention is the critical distinction between euthanasia and good palliative care (treatment to relieve distressing symptoms). The dosage of painkillers necessary to control a patient's pain may have the side effect of shortening his life. No moral objection arises as long as the drugs are not given with the intention of hastening the patient's death, but only in order to control the pain.
* The persistent vegetative state is increasingly referred to simply as the vegetative state. The use of vegetative in these expressions is gravely misleading since it suggests that a person in such a condition has somehow ceased to be human.
Doctors might act on an advance directive in circumstances which the patient did not foresee, or misinterpret the patient's wishes. While advance directives may be helpful to doctors in forming an impression of the patient's preferences, if they are binding, they are liable to tie the hands of doctors, preventing them from acting in the patient's best interests. A patient may not realise that withholding treatment will not necessarily lead to an earlier death with less suffering. It may, in fact, lead to a bed-bound state with greater impairment of health.
There is increasing concern among pro-life doctors and ethicists
that a patient should not be regarded as dead until there is evidence
of both brain stem death and the end of other vital functions. This
would safeguard against ending the lives of patients who had
volunteered for organ donation before natural death had occurred.
An
extended briefing is also avaliable.